Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/4727
Title: Modelling the effects of competition on seaports terminal awarding
Authors: Yip, TL 
Liu, JJ
Fu, X
Keywords: Port concession
Global terminal operators
Game theory
Incentives
Issue Date: 9-Jul-2010
Source: IAME 2010: Annual Conference of the International Association of Maritime Economists, Lisbon, Portugal, 7th-9th July 2010, p. [1-18] How to cite?
Abstract: While the importance of inter‐port competition and intra‐port competition has been well recognized in the studies related to sea ports, few theoretical models have been developed with which the effects of competition on terminal concession awarding can be explicitly addressed. To fill this gap in research, this study proposes a non‐cooperative game theory model, where two terminal operators apply for terminal concessions in two adjacent ports. The modelling results suggest that (a) a terminal operator’s profit increases with its market power. As a result, it always prefers to control more terminals in the region; (b) However, when all terminal operators expanded their operations to every competing port in the region, they will be worse off due to an increase of inter and intra port competitions, a situation similar to the prisoners’ dilemma; and (c) when a port authority has significant market power thus that it can charge a high price from, or share a large proportion of the terminal operators’ revenue, the port authority would prefer to introduce inter and intra port competitions, rather than allowing one terminal operator to monopoly all terminals in the region. Empirical evidences consistent with these modelling results are discussed in the paper.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/4727
Rights: Posted with permission of IAME (International Association of Maritime Economists)
Appears in Collections:Conference Paper

Access
View full-text via PolyU eLinks SFX Query
Show full item record

Page view(s)

329
Last Week
0
Last month
Checked on May 1, 2016

Download(s)

307
Checked on May 1, 2016

Google ScholarTM

Check



Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.