On the logical nature of pragmatic inference ——towards a formal theory of pragmatics

Abstract

本文探讨语用推理的逻辑实质,在介绍 了溯因推理的基本特点及其在逻辑和计算科学上的一些制约原则之后,我们将溯因法与语用推理特别是Grice理论和关联理论的语用原则相对照,认为语用推理 就是溯因推理在言语交际中的具体应用,而语用原则就是具体的溯因制约原则。语用推理并不那么独特,也不需要建立独立的“自然语言运用的逻辑”。最后,我们 探讨了溯因推理与概率的关系,期望建立以概率论为基础的形式化的溯因语用学理论。 This paper explores the logical nature of pragmatic reasoning. After introducing the basic features of abductive inference and its constraining principles in logic and computing science, we contrast abduction with pragmatic inference, with special reference to the pragmatic principles in Gricean theory and relevance theory. The conclusions are that pragmatic reasoning is no more than abductive inference as applied to verbal communication and that pragmatic principles are just special forms of abductive principles. Pragmatic reasoning is not that independent, nor is it necessary to establish the logic of language use. Finally, we explore the relationship between abduction and probability with the hope of establishing a probability-based formal theory of abductive pragmatics.