Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/36305
Title: Modeling the effects of competition on seaport terminal awarding
Authors: Yip, TL 
Liu, JJ
Fu, XW
Feng, JJ
Keywords: Seaports terminal awarding
Port competition
Intra-port competition
Port concessions
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Pergamon Press
Source: Transport policy, 2014, v. 35, p. 341-349 How to cite?
Journal: Transport policy 
Abstract: In the maritime transport industry, a terminal concession often specifies the competition conditions during the concession period. This study proposes a game model with which the effects of competition for seaport terminal awards can be studied. The modeling results suggest that (a) a terminal operator always prefers to control more terminals in the region; (b) if all terminal operators expand their operations to every port, they will be worse off due to an increase of inter- and intra-port competitions, a situation similar to the prisoners' dilemma; and (c) when a port authority has significant market power, it prefers to introduce inter- and intra-port competition, rather than allowing one operator to monopolize all terminals. (d) multiple equilibria may be observed in concession awarding depending on market characteristics associated to a particular market. Anecdotal observations consistent with these modeling results are presented and discussed.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/36305
ISSN: 0967-070X
DOI: 10.1016/j.tranpol.2014.04.007
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