Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/34122
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributorDepartment of Logistics and Maritime Studies-
dc.creatorYan, H-
dc.creatorWang, J-
dc.creatorHao, G-
dc.date.accessioned2015-08-28T04:31:35Z-
dc.date.available2015-08-28T04:31:35Z-
dc.identifier.issn1750-9653-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10397/34122-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.subjectLogistics serviceen_US
dc.subjectEnvironment managementen_US
dc.subjectIncentive contractsen_US
dc.subjectInformation structureen_US
dc.subjectRisk sharingen_US
dc.titleDesign of environmentally conscious incentive contracts for logistics servicesen_US
dc.typeJournal/Magazine Articleen_US
dc.identifier.spage98-
dc.identifier.epage110-
dc.identifier.volume1-
dc.identifier.issue2-
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/17509653.2006.10671001-
dcterms.abstractThere are two major hurdles, economy of scale and incentives for practice, in logistics service for environmentally friendly operations. This paper models and designs the incentive contracts between a company with environmental commitment and its logistics service provider. The company aims to encourage the logistic service provider to devote effort on environmental concerns. It is generally believed that such effort implies costly burden to the service provider but benefits the company. We consider different information structures in our models and show the corresponding contract forms. The research starts with investigating the contract form with symmetric information and known effort of the provider. Through single-period and multiple-period models, it is found that long run cooperation can benefit both parties. We then extend the model to a case where the effort of the provider is unobservable and unverifiable. It is found that with proper incentive compatible constraint, the provider will make the effort as expected. In addition, the optimal incentive contracts not only motivate the logistics service provider to make the expected effort on environmentally friendly operations, but it also acts as a risk sharing tool.-
dcterms.bibliographicCitationInternational journal of management science and engineering management, 2006, v. 1, no. 2, p. 98-110-
dcterms.isPartOfInternational journal of management science and engineering management-
dcterms.issued2006-
dc.identifier.eissn1750-9661-
dc.identifier.rosgroupidr33567-
dc.description.ros2006-2007 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journal-
Appears in Collections:Journal/Magazine Article
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