Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/34009
Title: A trade-off between non-fundamental risk and incentives
Authors: Fung, MK 
Keywords: CEO compensation
Fundamental risk
Non-fundamental risk
Performance decomposition
Issue Date: 2012
Source: Review of quantitative finance and accounting, 2012, p. 1-23 How to cite?
Journal: Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 
Abstract: This study conjectures that CEOs are rewarded more heavily for fundamental than for non-fundamental performance, and that the impact of non-fundamental risks is more negative than that of fundamental risks on pay-performance sensitivity. While the first conjecture stems from the controllability principle, the second conjecture is attributable to the interplay between the risk-incentive trade-off and delegation of responsibility to the agent. This study devised measures for fundamental and non-fundamental performance using an ARIMA-based unobserved-component approach. The two conjectures are strongly supported by this study's findings over a wide range of empirical specifications, indicating that the optimal level of pay-performance sensitivity depends not only on the degree, but also on the nature, of performance uncertainty.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/34009
ISSN: 0924-865X
DOI: 10.1007/s11156-012-0299-7
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