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Title: Modeling the decision-making using game theory in monitoring land-use practice in China
Authors: Wu, YZ
Wu, CF
Shen, LY
Keywords: Game strategy
Game Theory
Land use monitoring
Monitoring cost
Punishment intensity
Issue Date: 2005
Publisher: 中国学术期刊(光盘版)电子杂志社
Source: 系统工程理论与实践 (Systems engineering theory and practice), 2005, v. 25, no. 9, p. 65-70 How to cite?
Journal: 系统工程理论与实践 (Systems engineering theory and practice) 
Abstract: Using remote sensing technology becomes an important method for monitoring the land-use practice in China. For pursuing economic benefits, the local governments often implement various development programs by using state land illegally, thus it is essential to identify these illegal cases in using proper techniques such as remote sensing technology. The identification of those illegal cases will help government to adopt necessary punishment measures. It is believed that sufficient punishment measures will bring down the number of cases in using land illegally. In other words, increasing monitoring frequency will be able to control the land use practice. This paper is to build up a model using Game Theory for finding out an optimal monitoring frequency which enable the proper control over land use and at the same keep the monitoring costs to the minimum level. The model balances the monitoring frequency and the possibility of committing illegally land use by the local governments. A hypothetical example is presented to demonstrate the application of the model.
ISSN: 1000-6788
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