Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/30979
Title: Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing
Authors: Bliss, MA 
Keywords: Audit fee pricing
Board size
Corporate governance
G34
Independent directors
M42
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Source: Accounting and finance, 2011, v. 51, no. 2, p. 361-380 How to cite?
Journal: Accounting and finance 
Abstract: This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/30979
ISSN: 0810-5391
EISSN: 1467-629X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-629X.2010.00360.x
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