Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/29857
Title: Insiders' incentives for asymmetric disclosure and firm-specific information flows
Authors: Jiang, L 
Kim, JB
Pang, L
Keywords: Control-ownership wedge
Jump risks
Stock price informativeness
Timing of disclosure
Issue Date: 2013
Publisher: Elsevier
Source: Journal of banking and finance, 2013, v. 37, no. 9, p. 3562-3576 How to cite?
Journal: Journal of banking and finance 
Abstract: Recent research suggests that insiders' incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders' incentives for private control benefit, proxied by control-ownership wedge, affect firm-specific return characteristics. We find that control-ownership wedge is negatively related to the likelihood of positive return jumps and positively related to the extent of asymmetric market reaction to good news rather than to bad news. Overall, our results support the notion that corporate insiders increase opaqueness and withhold good news in order to capture unexpected cash flow.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/29857
ISSN: 0378-4266
EISSN: 1872-6372
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.05.001
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