Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/28551
Title: Optimal bidding strategies for competitive generators and large consumers
Authors: Wen, F
David, AK
Issue Date: 2001
Publisher: Elsevier
Source: International journal of electrical power and energy system, 2001, v. 23, no. 1, p. 37-43 How to cite?
Journal: International journal of electrical power and energy systems 
Abstract: There exists the potential for gaming such as strategic bidding by participants (power suppliers and large consumers) in a deregulated power market, which is more an oligopoly than a laissez-faire market. Each participant can increase his or her own profit through strategic bidding but this has a negative effect on maximizing social welfare. A method to build bidding strategies for both power suppliers and large consumers in a poolco-type electricity market is presented in this paper. It is assumed that each supplier/large consumer bids a linear supply/demand function, and the system is dispatched to maximize social welfare. Each supplier/large consumer chooses the coefficients in the linear supply/demand function to maximize benefits, subject to expectations about how rival participants will bid. The problem is formulated as a stochastic optimization problem, and solved by a Monte Carlo approach. A numerical example with six suppliers and two large consumers serves to illustrate the essential features of the method.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/28551
ISSN: 0142-0615
DOI: 10.1016/S0142-0615(00)00032-6
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