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Title: Game analysis and improvement of the medical expenses payment
Authors: Qing, F
Luo, L
Zhao, M
Ren, Q
Keywords: Fee for service
Game theory
Medical expenses payment
Mixed payment
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Springer
Source: Advances in intelligent systems and computing, 2014, v. 280, p. 35-43 How to cite?
Journal: Advances in intelligent systems and computing 
Abstract: Fee for Service is a widely used way of medical expenses payment. However, this kind of payment often stimulates the excessive medical services. This paper reveals the mechanism of excessive medical service through economic game theory. It is difficult to control health care cost under a single payment mode. Under the framework of new rural cooperative medical schemes, this paper presents a mixed payment and analyzes the game between Medical Insurance and hospital. Results indicate that choosing a mixed payment strategy according to certain probability distribution can always achieve the Pareto equilibrium solution of resource allocation and can also be helpful to control the excessive growth of medical expenses.
Description: 8th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management, ICMSEM 2014, Portugal, 25-27 July 2014
ISBN: 9783642551819
ISSN: 2194-5357
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-55182-6_4
Appears in Collections:Conference Paper

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