Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/27624
Title: On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
Authors: Li, C
Li, S
Asim, M
Nunez, J
Alvarez, G
Chen, G
Keywords: Chaos
Chosen-plaintext attack
Cryptanalysis
Image encryption
Known-plaintext attack
Issue Date: 2009
Publisher: Elsevier Science Bv
Source: Image and vision computing, 2009, v. 27, no. 9, p. 1371-1381 How to cite?
Journal: Image and Vision Computing 
Abstract: This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K10 can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; (3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: fenced(Ki mod 128)i = 410, which works very well when K10 is not too large; (4) when K10 is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/27624
DOI: 10.1016/j.imavis.2008.12.008
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