Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/16410
Title: CEO incentives and the health of defined benefit pension plans
Authors: Begley, J
Chamberlain, S
Yang, S 
Zhang, JL
Keywords: Defined benefit plans
Earnings management
Pension plan governance
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Springer
Source: Review of accounting studies, 2015, v. 20, no. 3, p. 1013-1058 How to cite?
Journal: Review of accounting studies 
Abstract: We examine the relation between CEO pay-related wealth and the funding levels, and freezing decisions, of defined benefit pension plans. Results show that higher funding levels occur when CEOs are most endowed in employee pension plans, but that spillover endowments in supplemental executive plans coincide with the lowest funding levels. CEO equity-wealth correlates with funding health in between the extremes. Further, “hard freezes” of employee plans are less likely, the larger the CEO’s total pension interest (in executive and employee plans together). This suggests that CEOs fear repercussions to their own pension plan when employee plans are frozen.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/16410
ISSN: 1380-6653
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9332-0
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