Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10397/13634
Title: Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues
Authors: Guo, P 
Hassin, R
Issue Date: 2011
Source: Operations research, 2011, v. 59, no. 4, p. 986-997
Abstract: We consider a single server queueing system in which service shuts down when there are no customers present and is resumed only when the queue length reaches a given critical length. We analyze the strategic response of customers to this mechanism and compare it to the overall optimal behavior, with and without information on delay. The results are significantly different from those obtained when the server is continuously available. We show that there may exist multiple equilibria in such a system and the optimal arrival rate may be greater or smaller than that of the decentralized equilibrium. Finally, the critical length is taken as a decision variable, and the optimal operations policy is discussed by taking strategic customers into consideration.
Keywords: Balking queue
Equilibrium analysis
Strategic customers
Vacation queue
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
Journal: Operations research 
ISSN: 0030-364x
EISSN: 1526-5463
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1100.0907
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