Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10397/11283
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor | Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies | - |
dc.creator | Wang, Y | - |
dc.creator | Niu, B | - |
dc.creator | Guo, P | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-03-30T06:31:06Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-03-30T06:31:06Z | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1059-1478 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10397/11283 | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley-Blackwell | en_US |
dc.rights | © 2012 Production and Operations Management Society | en_US |
dc.rights | This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Wang, Y., Niu, B. and Guo, P. (2013), On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer. Prod Oper Manag, 22: 104-119, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01336.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions. | en_US |
dc.subject | Competitive CM | en_US |
dc.subject | Contract manufacturing | en_US |
dc.subject | Cournot competition | en_US |
dc.subject | Outsourcing | en_US |
dc.subject | Quantity leadership | en_US |
dc.title | On the advantage of quantity leadership when outsourcing production to a competitive contract manufacturer | en_US |
dc.type | Journal/Magazine Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.spage | 104 | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 119 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 22 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 1 | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01336.x | - |
dcterms.abstract | This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non-competitive CM's wholesale price is high. | - |
dcterms.accessRights | open access | - |
dcterms.bibliographicCitation | Production and operations management, Jan.-Feb. 2013, v. 22, no. 1, p. 104-119 | - |
dcterms.isPartOf | Production and operations management | - |
dcterms.issued | 2013-01 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000313665800007 | - |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84872723124 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1937-5956 | - |
dc.identifier.rosgroupid | r63075 | - |
dc.description.ros | 2012-2013 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journal | - |
dc.description.oa | Accepted Manuscript | - |
dc.identifier.FolderNumber | a0774-n02 | - |
dc.identifier.SubFormID | 1592 | - |
dc.description.fundingSource | RGC | - |
dc.description.fundingText | 550110 | - |
dc.description.pubStatus | Published | - |
Appears in Collections: | Journal/Magazine Article |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
a0774-n02_1592.pdf | Pre-Published version | 1.87 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
Page views
236
Last Week
2
2
Last month
Citations as of Apr 21, 2024
Downloads
587
Citations as of Apr 21, 2024
SCOPUSTM
Citations
216
Last Week
1
1
Last month
1
1
Citations as of Apr 19, 2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
191
Last Week
1
1
Last month
0
0
Citations as of Apr 18, 2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.