Coping with competing institutional logics in environmental governance: evidence from China

Abstract

Although the existence of competing institutional logics has been widely discussed in hybrid organizations, the literature of public administration has been remarkably silent on this issue. To address this literature gap, this dissertation mainly focuses on the environmental protection logic and economic efficiency logic during the environmental policy implementation in the Chinese context. I analyzed interviews with frontline environmental enforcement officials and relevant archival materials. The results indicated that environmental protection logic increases street-level bureaucrats’ workload and responsibility, and the economic efficiency logic makes enforcement officials lack power, resources and incentives. These contradictions generate unclear responsibilities in different bureaus and increasing tasks, limited resources and greater pressure for enforcement officials with fewer rewards, leading to the coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats. In addition, I proposed two directions for future research. First, to explore whether coping behaviors affect the implementation performance and psychological factors of street-level bureaucrats, I proposed that coping behaviors of moving against regulatees have a mediating effect in policy implementation. Second, as environmental NGOs play an important role in environmental governance, I also discussed how the competing institutional logics may affect their survival and development in China.