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Immigrant Influx and Generational Politics: A Comparative Case Study of Hong Kong and Taiwan

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Abstract

Studies have long shown the existence of an age gap in voting behavior. We argue that the influx of immigrants can influence the size of this gap. Young people can become more apprehensive toward immigrants than older people because of the former's greater exposure to more competition from immigrants in the labor market and susceptibility to anti-immigrant sentiments in society. The age gap in attitudes toward immigrants can carry over to vote choice. We illustrate our argument with a comparative study of Hong Kong and Taiwan. While the two societies share many similarities, Hong Kong has experienced a significantly larger influx of immigrants from mainland China. Based on two election surveys in 2016, we find a distinct generational gap in attitudes toward immigrants in Hong Kong, but not in Taiwan. The age gap in Hong Kong also manifests itself in electoral support of China-resisting political parties.

Key Words Immigration, generational politics, attitudes toward immigrants, vote choice, party identification, China

1. Introduction

A large influx of immigrants can have potentially far-reaching effects on society. First, the immigrants may increase labor market competition, affecting the natives' wages (Friedberg, & Hunt 1995). Second, regardless of what the actual economic impacts are, a large immigrant influx may heighten natives' worries about the loss of local culture (Blinder, 2015; Coffé et al., 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007). These actual and perceived impacts may lead to a backlash against immigrants, giving rise to radical right-wing parties (Coffé et al., 2007; Lubbers et al., 2002).

The effects of immigration are unlikely homogenous across the native population. In this article, we examine how the influx of immigrants triggers different responses from young and mature citizens. Our central argument is that young people are particularly sensitive to a large influx of immigrants for various reasons. Young people have a weaker position in labor market, which is attested by their higher unemployment rate vis-a-vis adults'. Even though youth unemployment may not be directly caused by the influx of immigrants, the perception can easily develop and persist. In addition, young people may be more sensitive to the influence of prevailing political events, and also are more likely to have more diverse media exposure. When the large influx of immigrants provokes a widespread anti-immigrant sentiment in the receiving country, that sentiment may influence young people more than older generations. Accordingly, we hypothesize that a large influx of immigrants can intensify generational political differences by widening the gap between the young and adults in attitudes toward immigrants. This inter-generational "resentment gap" will translate into differences in vote choice.

We illustrate our argument with a comparative study of Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two societies have important social, economic, and political similarities. First, both Hong Kong and Taiwan are developed economies with sizable middle classes and similar cultural backgrounds. Second, both are located in the same geographical region under the political and economic influences of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Third, both have experienced the rise of youth activism in recent years. In particular, a large-scale student-led movement broke out in Taiwan (the Sunflower Movement) and in Hong Kong (the Umbrella Movement) in 2014.

Despite their similarities, there is one important difference between Hong Kong and Taiwan: the amount of immigrants from mainland China. In Hong Kong, mainland China has been the main source of immigration since at least the mid-1990s. Currently, one in seven of the city's residents is an immigrant from China after 1997, the year of sovereignty transfer. By contrast, Taiwan is not subject to such a program, and has not experienced the same level of immigration, especially from the PRC, partly because the unresolved sovereignty issue has continued to plague cross-Strait relations. Taiwanese authorities are cautious about exchanges with the PRC, including regulations on immigration. We hypothesize that the policy difference contributes to a more salient generational gap in attitudes toward immigrants in Hong Kong than in Taiwan. We also hypothesize that the age gap in attitudes toward immigrants in Hong Kong will carry over to vote choice.

Our key dependent variables are attitudes toward immigrants and vote choice. By analyzing two public opinion surveys separately collected during a legislative election that occurred in Hong Kong and Taiwan in 2016, we find a distinct generational gap in attitudes

toward immigrants in Hong Kong, but not in Taiwan. Compared to older citizens, young people in Hong Kong are less sympathetic toward immigrants. Because mainland China is the single most important source of immigrant source to Hong Kong, young people's hostility likely translates into electoral support for political parties that resist the influences of mainland China. Indeed, our data analysis shows that a distinct generational gap also exists in party identification and vote choice; young people in Hong Kong are more likely to identify with or vote for localist political parties, which are apprehensive of further social integration with China. In contrast, in the Taiwan case, although there are a number of political parties that are overtly pro-independence or China-resisting, we find no statistically significant generational gap in party identification and vote choice in Taiwan.

It is important to note that our argument is concerned with the *gap* in attitudes toward immigrants across generations, but not the average *level* of resentment against immigrants or against mainland China. Anti-China sentiment arguably runs deeper in Taiwan than in Hong Kong, which was potentially a contributing factor behind the Sunflower Movement. However, anti-China sentiment in Taiwan cuts across age groups, as opposed to the situations in Hong Kong.

While our empirical analyses focus on Hong Kong and Taiwan, the implications of these findings are broadly comparative. A large number of studies have examined factors affecting public attitudes toward immigrants. It is difficult, however, to come up with a conclusive answer without taking into the consideration of the magnitude of the immigrant influx. A key implication of this study is that when the scale of the influx is sufficiently large, the change in public opinions can be potentially dramatic. Not many countries experience the same level of immigrant influx for such an extended period of time as in Hong Kong, where the average annual increase in immigrant stock is approximately 1 percent of the population. Yet, as the wave of international migration continues or accelerates, more and more countries will need to deal with the changes in public attitudes toward immigrants that were unseen before.

2. Theoretical Framework

Political attitudes likely change with age for various reasons. First, studies find that ageing is associated with psychological changes, including increasing authoritarianism (Tilley, 2005), closed-mindedness (Kruglanski, 2013), and resistance to change (Neundorf et al., 2011; Alwin et al., 1991). These changes are potentially influenced by one's exposure to a variety of life events, such as entering the labor market, paying tax, and getting married.

Second, older people generally accumulate more material goods than the young (Binstock and Quadagno, 2011), while also having more family responsibilities. For those who are retired, they have to rely only on savings and pension to make their ends meet. Perhaps not surprisingly, as people get old, they have a greater concern over economic issues, for these issues may affect how to preserve their wealth (Goerres, 2008). This attitudinal change manifests itself in one’s investment decisions and opinions on social policy. Korniotis and Kumar (2011) find that older investors prefer less risky investment portfolios and trade less frequently. Other studies show that older people support increasing government spending on pensions and health care, but not on education and unemployment benefits (Esping-Anderson, 1999; Armingeon, 2007)

In addition to psychological and financial changes that coincide with life cycles, some point out that the age gap in political attitudes may arise from different political socialization experiences. In particular, the dominant political forces during one's formative years have lasting impacts on one's political attitudes (Butler and Stokes, 1974; Erikson et al., 2002; Flanagan, 2009). Because each cohort is exposed to a unique political environment, the common experience of each cohort gives rise to a distinct "political generation" (Mannheim, 1997). Most notably, Inglehart (1990) examines survey data from 26 countries collected in the 1970s and 1980s, and finds a significant value shift across generations; younger generations, who no longer need to struggle with existential security, increasingly care more about post-materialist concerns.

Many studies find that the age gap in political attitudes also manifests itself in voting behavior. For instance, in studying Swiss referendum votes on distributional issues between 1981 and 2004, Bonoli and Hausermann (2009) find that age is a strong predictor of vote choice. In particular, older generations predominantly vote for programs that improve the benefits that they can receive and disapprove those that help younger families. In another study, Aldrich and Kage (2011) show that age and location are the most important predictors of party support in Japan; older generations are more likely to support the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party. There are two reasons for this generational gap. The first is that elderly voters become more authoritarian. Second, the LDP has consistently redistributed income from the young to the old. In addition to vote choice, there is also a significant generational difference in voter turnout. For instance, Smets (2012) provides strong evidence that delayed transitions to adulthood, a phenomenon that is increasingly common in many countries, contribute to a widening gap in turnout between young and old voters.

The above studies clearly indicate the existence of an age gap in voting behavior, and vote choice in particular. The size of the age gap, however, can be influenced by many factors such as the dominant political issues during one's impressionable years (Tilley and Evans, 2011). In this study, we propose one factor that affects the size of the age gap in vote choice: the influx of immigrants. We present our argument in the next section.

3. Our argument

An immigrant influx can widen the generational gap in attitudes toward immigrants through two possible channels. Economically, young people are more vulnerable than adults in labor market, as attested by their higher unemployment rate. Figure 1 displays the youth unemployment rate across countries based on 2017 data collected from the World Development Indicators. As may be seen from the figure, in all but one country, youth unemployment rate is above the 45-degree line, indicating that youth unemployment rate is almost always higher than the national average. In addition, the gap between the two rates increases as the total unemployment rate increases, suggesting that young workers are more vulnerable to adverse labor market conditions than adults. Bell and Blanchflower (2011) provide several explanations for the higher youth unemployment rate. First and foremost, compared to adults, they lack general work skills and firm-specific human capital. Their experience of job search is also fairly limited, which feeds back into a lower ability to acquire job experience. Firms are also more likely to lay off young workers, because statutory

severance payments are attached to seniority in most countries (Heckman and Pages, 2000; Neumark and Wascher, 2004).

Figure 1: Cross-national Unemployment Rates in 2017: Young v. Total



Source: World Development Indicators.
Notes: Youth unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force ages 15-24 without work but available for and seeking employment, whereas the total unemployment rate refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. A 45-degree line is drawn.

Suffice it to say, compared with adult workers with extensive work experiences, young people are more vulnerable to labor market competition resulting from the influx of immigrants. For instance, Blanchflower and Shadforth (2009) provide suggestive evidence that the influx of immigrants from the A8 Accession countries has adverse impacts on the employment of low-skilled young people in the United Kingdom. Schotte & Winkler (2018), based on household surveys for 25 countries, find that older generations tend to be more pro-immigration, because the elderly, who are less likely to work, are less exposed to the labor market competition with immigrants.

The extent to which immigrants actually affect youth unemployment is likely context-specific, dependent on a variety of factors such as occupation, industry, skill, and the number of immigrants. Yet, even if one's economic well-being is not directly impacted by immigrants, the perceived economic threat may still cause concerns among native workers, as immigrants can easily become a scapegoat for economic problems (Dollard et al., 1939). Laryš & Mareš (2011) discuss how the influx of immigrants who resist to integrate with local communities fuels xenophobic feelings among some Russian youths. Ethnic threats are a powerful cue to mobilize people to support exclusionary policies (Scheepers et al., 2002) such as welfare chauvinism (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997).

The resentment gap between young and old generations can be mitigated by sociotropic factors. The influx of immigrants is likely associated with perceived threats of cultural and traditional values. Because older people tend to value traditions more than younger generations (O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006), some show that older people are more anti-immigrants than younger generations (Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015). In addition, Inglehart (1997) contends that post-materialistic values gradually replace materialistic concerns in postwar societies. If this is the case, we have reason to believe that young people are more likely to embrace inclusiveness and diversity. Hence, they are less hostile toward immigrants.

The extent to which these sociotropic features of younger generations can write off the economic effect remains unclear. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) contend that the sociotropic factors play a significantly more important role than economic factors in conditioning one's attitude toward immigrants. Malhotra et al. (2013), however, show that when immigrants pose a competition threat that is sufficiently realistic, natives' attitude toward immigrants can become dramatically negative. In addition, young people are particularly sensitive to political changes. As Green et al. (2004) point out, "the influences of the political environment are most noticeable among young voters, whose partisan attachments often bear the stamp of the political Zeitgeist that prevailed when they reached voting age (p. 107 - 8)." When the influx of immigrants triggers a large-scale social backlash against immigrants, young people are likely more susceptible to its influences.

The resentment gap between young and old citizens may be further enlarged by the proliferation of media channels. Young people have significantly higher exposure to social media than older people (Perrin, 2015). Analyzing the news coverage of immigration in the Netherlands, Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007) show that the more prominently immigration issues figure in newspapers, the higher the aggregate vote intention for anti-immigrant parties. Similarly, Mierin & Koroleva (2015) find that in Europe, young people who are exposed to more media channels are more likely to hold xenophobic and far-right sentiments. Most far-right parties have an overt anti-immigration stance (Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). Lucassen & Lubbers (2012) and Lubbers et al. (2002) find that young people are overrepresented in the electorate for radical right-wing parties in Europe.

4. Immigrant Influx: Hong Kong v. Taiwan

4.1 Background

Hong Kong and Taiwan are small and developed economies located in East Asia. In the post-war era, both places actively engaged in export trades, which helped them achieve phenomenal growth within a short period of time. Between 1979 and 2015, their per capita GDP experienced roughly a tenfold increase.[1] Culturally, both are Chinese-speaking communities under the influence of Confucianism. Taiwan has a population three times larger than that of Hong Kong. As of 2015, the population of Taiwan stood at 23.4 million, while that of Hong Kong is around 7 million.

Despite the above similarities, their political systems are markedly different. Taiwan is a de facto independent state with a democratically elected government, whereas the former British colony Hong Kong has become a special administrative region (HKSAR) of the

[1] The per capita GDP of Taiwan and Hong Kong in 2015 is US$22,355 and US$38,858, respectively.

People's Republic of China since 1997. The political difference has far-reaching impacts on how they deal with their common supersized neighbor, the PRC.

4.2 Immigration Policies

Owing to its unique political history with the PRC, Taiwan has developed a fairly complicated immigration system. Immigrants are divided into six groups, which can be further subsumed under two broad categories: foreigners and ethnic Chinese. The latter include people from Hong Kong, Macao, and mainland China. For foreign workers,[2] they can gain Taiwan citizenship through naturalization, on the condition that they stay in Taiwan for four to six years, and are willing to give up their original citizenship.

Regulations on mainland immigrants are more stringent than those applied to foreigners because population movement Taiwan and China is still considered a national security issue (Wang, 2011). For instance, there is an annual quota of 15,000 on the number of visa issued to mainland Chinese who want to migrate to Taiwan. Applications can be denied based on national security or social stability reasons. In most cases, only mainlanders who have a direct Taiwanese relative (e.g. spouse or parents) can be admitted. Admitted applicants still need to pass several hurdles before they can gain permanent residence.[3] In all likelihood, it takes at least six years for a qualified mainland Chinese to acquire the status of permanent resident, after which they still have to wait two years before they can apply for citizenship. The time to citizenship from that point on varies from case to case.

In recent years, more mainland Chinese enter Taiwan as college students. Yet, they cannot stay and work in Taiwan after getting the degree. Nor are they allowed to work as a teaching or research assistant. Such a restriction does not apply to other non-local students.

The situation in Hong Kong is in stark contrast to that of Taiwan. The city has continued to receive a large influx of mainland immigrants. As may be seen in Table 1, the number of mainland immigrants Hong Kong accepts each year accounts for almost one percent of the population, which is roughly nine times more than that in Taiwan. The largest immigration scheme in Hong Kong is known as the "one-way permit" system, which doles out 150 daily immigration quota to mainland citizens. The daily quota allows up to 54,000 immigrants to settle in Hong Kong each year. Most of these immigrants have a spouse or parents in Hong Kong.

Since the early 2000s, the government has implemented more immigration schemes geared toward wealthy and highly skilled mainland immigrants, including the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals and the Quality Migrant Admission Scheme (QMAS), in which "quality migrants" are able to gain residence in Hong Kong even without any employment contract. The Hong Kong government also opens more opportunities for mainlanders to pursue higher education in Hong Kong. The number of mainland students enrolled in universities increased from about 3,000 in 2002 to 12,000 in 2014. Starting from 2007, the government further launched a new program known as "Immigration Arrangements for Non-local Graduates (IANG)" to attract non-local degree holders to continue to stay in

[2] Foreign workers exclude "foreign laborers" who are commonly employed in low-skilled jobs.

[3] For example, prior to 2009, mainland applicants for permanent residence were denied rights to work in Taiwan.

Hong Kong, even if they are not able to secure a job immediately after graduation. As with the QMAS, mainland students make up the lion's share of the IANG intake. In 2016, for example, more than 92 percent of the IANG visas went to mainland students.

To many mainlanders, the attractiveness of Hong Kong as a migration site is not confined to economic and educational opportunities. Prior to 2015, the PRC vigorously enforced the one-child policy. Violators of this rule were heavily fined or forced to abort. Because the one-child policy did not apply to Hong Kong, many mainlanders sidestepped the birth control rule by giving birth in Hong Kong. Although babies born this way in Hong Kong are not considered to be immigrants, their massive number once created an enormous controversy in Hong Kong.

The large immigrant influx coincides with a large influx of mainland visitors and tourists. In 2003, the Hong Kong government signed the Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), which aimed to increase the city's socio-economic integration with mainland. Thanks to various tourism schemes associated with the CEPA, Hong Kong's mainland tourists skyrocketed. Table 1 shows that the number of mainland visitors to Hong Kong as a share of total visitors increased from 41.2 percent in 2002 to 75.51 percent in 2016. The visitor influx that Hong Kong experienced looks more dramatic if one considers its sheer volume. For instance, in 2016, there were 42.7 million mainland visitors, which is six times the city's population. By contrast, the 3.5 million mainland visitors to Taiwan in the same year only account for about one seventh of the island's population.

Table 1: Annual Change In Immigrants And Visitors: Hong Kong and Taiwan

Year	Hong Kong				Taiwan			
	Mainland Immigrants		Foreign Residents	Mainland Visitors	Mainland Immigrants		Foreign Residents	Mainland Visitors
	Number	As A Share Of The Population (%)	Number	As A Share Of All Visitors (%)	Number	As A Share Of The Population (%)	Number	As A Share Of All Visitors (%)
2007	40692	0.59	26589	54.97	29366	0.13	-10457	8.26
2008	52640	0.76	26930	57.15	28513	0.12	-10157	8.56
2009	61059	0.88	21427	60.68	60750	0.26	-3916	22.12
2010	56740	0.81	27193	62.96	41280	0.18	-4073	29.29
2011	60438	0.85	30939	67.03	29643	0.13	5321	29.31
2012	72969	1.02	28890	71.81	25941	0.11	-3462	35.37
2013	65075	0.91	28572	75.04	24883	0.11	1134	35.86
2014	64540	0.89	31846	77.66	24225	0.1	6843	40.23
2015	59956	0.82	34484	77.3	22041	0.09	919	40.08
2016	79214	1.07	36784	75.51	23069	0.1	3983	32.85

Sources: Ministry of Transportation and Communications (2017); National Immigration Agency (2017); Lai (2013); Census and Statistics Department (2012).
Notes: The immigrant data of Hong Kong include immigrants who entered Hong Kong through the following immigration schemes: One-way Permit, Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professionals, Capital Investment Entrant Scheme, Quality Migrant Admission Scheme, and Immigration Arrangements for Non-local Graduates. "Foreign Residents" exclude foreign labor/domestic helpers in Taiwan and Hong Kong, respectively.

4.3 Aftermath

The massive influx of mainland immigrants and visitors alike triggered a strong local resentment in Hong Kong. Media attention focused on how mainland pregnant women caused congestion in local hospital facilities and services, how mainland parallel trades created shortage of baby formulas, how mainland capital pushed up housing prices in Hong Kong, and how "new immigrants" from mainland China crowded out local people in government

subsidized housing (Tang and Yuen, 2016). Because internet censorship was absent in Hong Kong, the anti-mainland sentiment found insulting expression in the online sphere. Some compared mainlanders to locusts, insects that fly in large groups and devastate fields and crops. Others circulated online footages that featured misbehaving mainlanders on public transport or on the streets in Hong Kong. The anti-mainland sentiment reached new heights, long before the outbreak of the Umbrella Movement. In recent elections, the identity of immigrants is further politicized, as some express concerns that the Chinese immigrants are predominantly supporters of pro-Beijing parties (Hong Kong 01, 2018; Hong Kong Economic Journal, 2016).

It is important to note that the influx of mainland people and capital has brought substantial economic benefits to Hong Kong. They helped the city's housing market recover from a recession. They also reinforced Hong Kong's status as a global offshore hub for dealing with the business of the renminbi, the Chinese currency. The influx of mainland tourists and shoppers created a boom in service industries in the city (Wong, 2015). These benefits, however, are not evenly distributed. In particular, young people may not be able to feel it, perhaps for a good reason. As may be seen from Figure 2, for much of the post-1997 period, the average monthly salary of young people in Hong Kong experienced no increase, regardless of their education level. For those who obtained only a post-secondary degree (comparable to a degree from a community college), their monthly income even records a decline by 13 percentage points.

Figure 2: Percentage Change of Average Monthly Income of Young Workers By Education 1999 - 2014



Sources: Office of Financial Secretary (2016); Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (2017); Li (2015).
Notes: "Young workers" are defined as those aged 20 to 24 in Hong Kong. The Taiwan data report the monthly income of first-time employees at different age groups.

The cause of the general wage decline of young people is complex, involving potential factors such as expansion of university enrollment, job polarization, and changing economic structure. The extent to which the influx of immigrants adversely impacts young workers entails an empirical investigation that is beyond the scope of this article. Yet, the anti-mainland sentiment was increasingly popular among young people, as evidenced by the surge of localism in Hong Kong during the 2010s. In Hong Kong, while the term localism refers to "a galaxy of ideas" (Veg, 2017), its central tenet is that Hong Kong has its unique cultural, linguistic, and historical roots that set the city apart from mainland China (Kaeding, 2017). Although not all localist groups or political parties are overtly anti-immigrants, all of them embrace the idea of prioritization of Hong Kong's local interests. For instance, a new political party, Demosistō, sets self-determination as its fundamental political goal, while the Hong Kong National Party, founded in 2016, advocates Hong Kong independence. Note that leaders of these new parties are predominantly activists in their twenties. Not surprisingly, their supporters also tend to be young.

As discussed earlier, senior citizens are potentially more hostile to immigrants, because they tend to have a greater concern for traditional values. The Hong Kong case is complicated because many senior citizens were former refugees from mainland China in the post-war period. The traditional values that these older generations hold stem from a Chinese identity. By contrast, young people in Hong Kong are predominantly locally born, and they have a relatively weaker identification with traditional Chinese values. In other words, the sociotropic and political economy factors that shape young people's attitudes toward immigrants end up reinforcing, rather than weakening, each other.

The situation in Taiwan was different. Because the island has experienced no enormous influx of immigrants, it has yet to develop a strong resentment against immigration. In addition, facing a shrinking birth rate and an aging population, the Taiwanese government is amending its obsolete and discriminative immigration regulations to attract foreign talents, including those from the PRC. Unlike Hong Kong, anti-immigrant sentiments remain relatively weak in Taiwan. Compared to a survey conducted ten years ago, a recent study finds that public attitudes toward Southeast and mainland marriage migrants in 2014 are fairly positive, with about 45 percent of the respondents supporting the removal of restrictions on the acquisition of citizenship (Chen & Ng, 2017). Suffice it to say, immigration is not a salient issue in Taiwan's electoral politics.

This is not to say, however, that anti-China sentiments are absent in Taiwan. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is considered a long-time anti-China party, because it advocates Taiwan independence. In fact, whether Taiwan should seek independence or unification with mainland China is a long-standing cleavage that structures party competition on the island (Tsai, 2016; Hsieh & Niou, 2005). Yet, this cleavage is largely independent of the age factor.

5. Hypotheses

Based on the above discussion, we derive three testable hypotheses concerning the impacts of immigrant influx on generational politics in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

> Hypothesis 1: The generational gap in attitudes toward immigrants is more pronounced in Hong Kong than in Taiwan.
>
> Hypothesis 2: The generational gap in the political identification of China-resisting parties is more pronounced in Hong Kong than in Taiwan.
>
> Hypothesis 3: The generational gap in the electoral support of the China-resisting parties is more pronounced in Hong Kong than in Taiwan.

In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are political parties that bear a brazen pro-China or China-resisting label (see Table 2). Party identification is weak in Hong Kong, but the cleavage between political camps is salient. Hence, political identification refers to one's favorable disposition toward a political camp, rather than a party (pro-China or China-resisting). Similarly, vote choice measures if one votes for any party within a particular political camp.

Table 2: Pro-China and China-resisting Political Parties in Hong Kong and Taiwan

	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Pro-China	Business and Professionals Alliance for Hong Kong, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions, Liberal Party, New People's Party,	Kuomintang, New Party, People First Party
China-resisting	Civic Passion, Democracy Groundwork, Demosistō, Hong Kong Localism Power, Kowloon East Community, Land Justice League, Pioneer of Victoria Park, Proletariat Political Institute, Youngspiration	Democratic Progressive Party, New Power Party, Taiwan Solidarity Union

Notes: In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are political parties that are neither overtly pro-China nor overtly China-resisting. These parties are not shown in the above table.

6. Data and Operationalization

We test the above hypotheses using two public opinion surveys: the Hong Kong Election Study (HKES) and the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). The HKES and the TEDS implemented, respectively, a post-election survey after a legislature election in Hong Kong and Taiwan held respectively in 2016. These two surveys have common questions that ask respondents' attitudes toward immigration, vote choice, and partisan identification. The common questions employed in this study are presented in the appendix. The HKES and the TEDS have 1,776 and 1,690 observations, respectively. The data of the TEDS come from a face-to-face survey, while the HKES commissioned YouGov to conduct the post-election survey based on its online sample that is representative of the voting population. For the TEDS, the data were collected by Election Study Center of the National Chengchi University. A nationally representative sample of adults aged 20 (the minimum voting age) or older was randomly drawn in three stages in accordance with the probability proportional to size (PPS) method. In the first stage, electoral constituencies were selected according to major geographical regions. In the second stage, villages were selected in electoral constituencies drawn in the first stage. Respondents were then selected in each of the villages drawn in the third stage. The data contain 1,690 valid observations.

To test Hypothesis 1, we use two questions from the HKES and TEDS to measure the attitudes toward immigrants. The first question asks respondents if they agree that immigrants harm local culture, while the second question asks respondents if they agree that immigrants are good for the local economy.[4] These two questions are intended to capture the economic and sociotropic factors behind anti-immigrant sentiments. For ease of comparison, we re-orient the coding of the questions, such that high values indicate hostile feelings toward immigrants.

As may be seen from Figure 3 (left panel), Hong Kong people seem to be more hostile toward immigrants than their Taiwan counterparts. In particular, the former have a significantly higher average score over the question concerning immigrants' bad influences on local culture. The perceived sociotropic threat seems to figure more prominently than the perceived economic threat in Hong Kong. The reverse is true in Taiwan, where the respondents seem to be more concerned about the impacts of immigration on the local economy rather than the local culture.

[4] For the exact wordings of the questions in these surveys, see the appendix.

Figure 3: Attitudes Toward Immigrants And China-resisting Parties: Hong Kong v. Taiwan



Sources: HKES and TEDS.
Notes: "Vote" in Hong Kong refers to the HKES respondents' self-reported vote for the geographical constituencies, whereas "vote" in Taiwan refers to the TEDS respondents' self-reported vote for the at-large seats.

To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we use two questions from these surveys that ask respondents to report their party identification and vote choice in the respective legislative election held in 2016. The right panel of Figure 3 shows the overall attitudes toward China-resisting parties. We also provide the actual vote share that the China-resisting camp received. As may be seen from the figure, the vote shares in the surveys and are fairly similar to those in the actual elections. Unsurprisingly, the China-resisting parties enjoy significantly greater public support in Taiwan than in Hong Kong. For one thing, the China-resisting parties in Taiwan, most notably the Democratic Progressive Party, have been a dominant political force for more than two decades, whereas those in Hong Kong emerged only recently.

Figure 3 displays the *level* of public approval of immigrants and China-resisting parties, but our key concern is the age *gap* in these attitudes, which will be estimated by regression analyses. Depending on the outcome variable of interest, we run either logit or ordered logit regressions. Our variable of interest is generational gap, which is measured by a dummy variable for young people. We define young people as someone aged 25 or below.[5]

[5] Note that the minimum voting ages are 18 and 20 in Hong Kong and Taiwan, respectively. For this reason, HKES excludes respondents aged below 18, whereas the youngest respondents in the TEDS are aged 20.

To reduce omitted variable bias, we include in all regression specifications the following control variables: gender, immigrant status, marital status, income, and education.[6]

7. Regression Results

We first examine attitudes toward immigrants. Table 3 displays the results of our ordered logistic regression analyses. As may be seen from the table, the coefficient on the variable of interest **young** is positive and significant at 0.1 percent in specifications related to Hong Kong, suggesting that young people indeed view immigrants more negatively than adults. In addition, the coefficient in the second specification is 23 percent larger than that in the first, which implies that perceived sociotropic threats play a more important role in shaping the anti-immigration sentiment. By contrast, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the Taiwan sample. In fact, it actually has a negative sign, indicating that young people in Taiwan may have a more positive feeling toward immigrants than older people. The results in Table 3 therefore, are consistent with Hypothesis 1; an immigrant influx is associated with a wider age gap in attitudes toward immigrants.

As for other demographic variables, **female** is consistently positive and statistically significant across all specifications, suggesting that female respondents in both Hong Kong and Taiwan are more averse to immigrants than their male counterparts. One possible reason is that immigrants pose a greater threat against female workers in the labor market. In Taiwan, married people are less sympathetic toward immigrants, whereas anti-immigration sentiment is negatively correlated with income and education.

[6] There are minor differences in how education is coded in the HKES and the TEDS. For the HKES, we use two dummy variables for education: **postsecondary degree** and **university degree**, whereas for the TEDS data, we use **high school** and **university degree**. In the HKES regressions, we also control for district fixed effects.

Table 3: Age Gap In Attitudes Toward Immigrants: Hong Kong v. Taiwan

	Hong Kong		Taiwan	
	Perceived Economic Threats	Perceived Cultural Threats	Perceived Economic Threats	Perceived Cultural Threats
Young	0.552***	0.723***	-0.027	-0.083
	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.201)	(0.282)
Female	0.666***	0.611***	0.327**	0.292*
	(0.159)	(0.149)	(0.107)	(0.125)
Born in HK/Taiwan	0.187	0.415	-0.226	-1.031
	(0.264)	(0.220)	(0.488)	(0.532)
Married	-0.081	0.030	0.497***	0.574**
	(0.165)	(0.156)	(0.142)	(0.174)
Income	-0.042	-0.006	-0.046*	-0.050*
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Education: High School/Diploma	-0.315	-0.140	-0.292	-0.181
	(0.199)	(0.192)	(0.175)	(0.172)
Education: College	-0.476*	-0.150	-0.382*	-0.644***
	(0.202)	(0.196)	(0.187)	(0.179)
Cutoff Point 1	-2.894***	-1.795***	-4.672***	-4.260***
	(0.465)	(0.616)	(0.591)	(0.605)
Cutoff Point 2	-0.759	0.324	-0.534	-0.303
	(0.494)	(0.558)	(0.540)	(0.597)
Cutoff Point 3	0.930	1.797**	-0.101	0.084
	(0.501)	(0.557)	(0.540)	(0.592)
Cutoff Point 4	2.103***	3.295***	2.993***	2.442***
	(0.516)	(0.564)	(0.555)	(0.589)
Number of Observations	1731	1738	1222	1240

Sources: HKES and TEDS.

Notes: We estimate the above specifications using ordered logistic regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. Cutoff points refer to ancillary parameters that define the ordinal categories of a dependent variable of interest. *<0.05, **<0.01. ***<0.001

Table 4 presents the results of our logistic regressions related to political identification and vote choice. In addition to the preferences for China-resisting parties, we also provide the regression results concerning the preferences for pro-China parties for comparison.[7] As may be seen from the table, the variable of interest **young** is again a significant predictor for both political identification and vote choice in Hong Kong. In particular, young people in Hong Kong are more likely to identify themselves with and vote for China-resisting parties than adults. The coefficients on this variable are positive and statistically significant. On the other hand, young people in Hong Kong are also significantly less likely to vote for pro-China parties, although we find no evidence that they are less likely to identify themselves with the pro-China camp.

[7] Note that in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are parties that are neither pro-China nor China-resisting, which implies that examining both China-resisting and pro-China outcomes will not induce collinearity.

Table 4: Age Gap In Attitudes Toward China-resisting Parties: Hong Kong v. Taiwan

	Hong Kong				Taiwan			
	Identify With China-resisting Parties	Identify With Pro-China Parties	Vote For China-resisting Parties	Vote For Pro-China Parties	Identify With China-resisting Parties	Identify With Pro-China Parties	Vote For China-resisting Parties	Vote For Pro-China Parties
Young	0.760**	-0.459	1.283***	-0.712**	0.178	-0.569*	0.038	-0.563
	(0.239)	(0.294)	(0.188)	(0.258)	(0.222)	(0.273)	(0.220)	(0.288)
Female	-0.292	-0.466*	0.152	-0.401*	-0.157	0.096	-0.110	0.174
	(0.195)	(0.222)	(0.200)	(0.191)	(0.116)	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.127)
Born in HK/Taiwan	-0.180	-0.872**	-0.181	-0.561	0.957	-1.880**	1.168	-1.728*
	(0.369)	(0.331)	(0.317)	(0.298)	(0.811)	(0.632)	(0.783)	(0.702)
Married	-0.439	0.859***	-0.297	0.657**	-0.138	0.249	-0.032	0.411*
	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.184)	(0.205)	(0.148)	(0.156)	(0.143)	(0.164)
Income	0.044	-0.012	0.114*	-0.051	0.019	0.063**	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.023)
Education: High School/Diploma	0.167	0.208	0.263	0.359	-0.206	0.834***	-0.249	0.570**
	(0.271)	(0.318)	(0.263)	(0.272)	(0.182)	(0.240)	(0.183)	(0.218)
Education: College	0.409	0.179	0.162	0.244	-0.123	0.883***	-0.407*	0.668**
	(0.317)	(0.283)	(0.255)	(0.249)	(0.198)	(0.261)	(0.201)	(0.236)
Constant	-2.394***	-1.021	-3.109***	-0.281	-1.142	-0.440	-1.019	-0.108
	(0.597)	(0.728)	(0.610)	(0.629)	(0.845)	(0.683)	(0.818)	(0.747)
Number of Observations	1776	1776	1776	1776	1323	1323	1323	1323

Sources: HKES and TEDS.
Notes: We estimate the above specifications using logistic regression. "Vote For Pro-China/China-resisting Parties" in Taiwan refers to the TEDS respondents' self-reported vote for the at-large seats. Standard errors are in parentheses. *<0.05, **<0.01. ***<0.001

By contrast, in Taiwan, the variable **young** is a poor predictor for political identification with and electoral support for China-resisting parties. The coefficient on this variable is not statistically different from zero in the two specifications related to the China-resisting camp. The results suggest that these parties are likely popular across age groups. We find strong support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Note, however, the coefficient on the variable **young** is negative and significant in the specification related to the identification with pro-China parties. The results imply that as far as political identification is concerned, while young people are no more likely to identify themselves with China-resisting parties, as opposed to other parties, they are least favorably disposed toward the pro-China camp.

8. Robustness Checks

As mentioned, Hong Kong experienced a large-scale democracy protest in 2014. Beijing's refusal to make concessions to the protesters, together with its increasing interference with Hong Kong's political development, may foment anti-China sentiments in the city. The sentiments would then lead to a growing rejection of mainland influences. Consequently, we may observe the concurrent rise of China-resisting parties and hostility toward mainland immigrants. If the protest-induced anti-China sentiments are, for various reasons, negatively correlated with age, we would observe the age gap as shown in the previous tables. In other words, it is the failed democracy protest, rather than the immigrant influx, that causes the age gap in electoral support of China-resisting parties in Hong Kong.

While we do not rule out the potential influences of the Umbrella Movement, it is instructive to evaluate whether young people in Hong Kong have a wholesale rejection of PRC influences. We conduct a falsification test using two questions from the HKES and TEDS: (1) the impacts of economic integration with mainland China on the economy and (2) the impacts of economic integration with mainland China on oneself. If we detect the same negative feelings toward evaluation of economic integration with mainland China among young people, it would then suggest that the gap in the electoral support of China-resisting parties is not peculiar to the influences of immigration.

As may be seen from the left panel of Figure 4, the coefficients on the **young** dummy is positive, and barely miss the 95 percent confidence interval in these regressions. The findings indicate that young people in Hong Kong and Taiwan do not completely dismiss the potential benefits of PRC influences. It is only a specific kind of mainland influences – namely, the influx of immigrants – that young people in Hong Kong disapprove.

Figure 4: Robustness Checks: Economic Integration With Mainland China And Democratic Values



Sources: HKES and TEDS.
Notes: The error bars represent a 95 percent confidence interval of the coefficient on the variable of interest, **young**. All specifications include the same set of controls as in Table 3.

The age gap in the electoral support of China-resisting parties may be due to a generational difference in democratic values. It is possible that young people are more pro-democracy than older people, and pro-democracy individuals may be more likely to support China-resisting parties.

To assess whether there is a generational difference in democratic values, we use two common questions in the surveys. The first asks respondents to report their satisfaction with the democratic development in Hong Kong/Taiwan, while the second involves the evaluation of the statement: "Democracy is preferable to any other kind of regime."

As may be seen from the right panel of Figure 4, we find little evidence for an age gap in democratic values. In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, young people are no more likely to prefer democracy to other regimes and feel dissatisfied with democratic development than

older people. The results do not favor the claim that the age gap in the electoral support of China-resisting parties in Hong Kong is driven mainly by a generational difference in democratic values.

We further check robustness of our findings by re-running the major specifications with more age groups added. As mentioned, young people are vulnerable to immigrants' competition threats in the labor market. Our argument implies that as one grows older and accumulates more work-related experience and skills, they would become less threatened by the influx of immigrants. In addition, in the case of Hong Kong, older people are more likely to be long-time immigrants themselves. For this reason, they may be more sympathetic toward current immigrants.

Figure 5 displays the coefficients on more fine-grained age group dummies in eight specifications (four about Hong Kong and four about Taiwan). Note that these specifications include all control variables as in the previous regression tables. The baseline category of these specifications is respondents aged 56 or above. As may be seen from the figure, in Hong Kong, anti-immigrant sentiments decrease almost linearly in age. The probability of identifying with or voting for China-resisting parties also declines across successive generations. Because we have controlled for birthplace in these regressions, the negative correlation between anti-immigrant attitudes (disposition toward China-resisting parties) and age is less likely driven by respondents' own immigrant status.

As for Taiwan, we detect no clear relationship between age and anti-immigrant attitudes or disposition toward China-resisting parties. The coefficient on the variable of interest (Age 20 - 25) is either negative or statistically insignificant in these specifications, which is consistent with our main findings.

Figure 5: Robustness Checks: Including More Age Groups



Sources: HKES and TEDS.
Notes: The baseline category is respondents aged 56 or above. All specifications include the same set of controls as in Table 3. "Vote For China-resisting Parties" in Taiwan refers to the TEDS respondents' self-reported vote for the at-large seats. The error bars represent a 95 percent confidence interval.

9. Conclusion

Extant studies on generational differences in political attitudes provide strong evidence for the existence of age gap in voting behavior. This gap, however, is not static. Its size may change over time and under different circumstances. In this study, we argue that an influx of immigrants can lead to the widening of the age gap because the actual and perceived impacts of immigrants on local population likely vary by age groups. We illustrate our argument using a comparative study of Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two cases have important cultural, geographical, and social similarities. Despite these similarities, the former society has experienced a significantly larger and continual influx of immigrants from mainland China. Based on the data from two election studies, we find evidence for our argument. In particular, we find a distinct generational gap in attitudes toward immigrants in Hong Kong, but not in Taiwan. The age gap in Hong Kong carries over to political identification with and electoral support for China-resisting parties. The results are not surprising, considering that mainland China is by far the city's most important source of immigrants. Our findings are illuminating to researchers and policy makers alike who are concerned with the social integration impact of immigration. This study also sheds lights on the design of future research that probes into the political and social impacts of immigrations and refugee diaspora on political and party systems.

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