

Ephemeris Monitor with Ambiguity Resolution for CAT II/III GBAS

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Abstract In safety critical applications, such as the Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) for precision approaches in civil aviation, it is important to safeguard users under the case of ephemeris failures. For CAT II/III approaches, different ephemeris monitors with approaches for ambiguity resolution are proposed with the double differenced carrier phase as the test statistics. The continuity risks introduced by the ambiguity resolution is addressed by deriving the required averaging time for new, acquired and re-acquired satellites. Since the ephemeris fault is closely related with the baseline length between ground stations, the minimum baseline length is derived to meet the probability of missed detection (PMD) region. Current methods are compared with both the averaging time and the ground baseline length. It is demonstrated that a combination of two methods is able to achieve the best performance with 94 averaging epochs and 218 m ground baseline length.

Keywords GNSS, GBAS, Integrity Monitor, Ephemeris Monitor

Introduction

The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is used for precision approaches in civil aviation to improve both the accuracy and integrity of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) (Annex-10 2018). With accuracy improved by a local area differential positioning scheme between the ground and airborne receivers, how to guarantee the safety of aviation users within the required integrity level is a more challenging task. Integrity monitoring is implemented in airborne and ground subsystems for incidents that may result in large position errors. Failure of ranging source failure is one of the causes. Five types of threats are characterized in GBAS, including ionospheric

29 anomaly, code-carrier divergence, signal deformation, satellite clock, and ephemeris failure
30 (Brenner and Liu 2010; Jiang et al. 2017). It is within the responsibility of the ground subsystem
31 to detect the ranging faults and remove the satellite before it is incorporated in the airborne solution.

32 In the early history of GPS, the ephemeris error greater than 50 m has occurred on 24
33 occasions. A more recent case was observed on GPS SV54 with errors larger than 350 m in 2014
34 (Gratton et al. 2007). In GBAS, the ephemeris threat occurs when the broadcast ephemeris
35 parameters yield excessive satellite position errors perpendicular to the ground subsystem's line of
36 sight (LOS) to the satellite (SARPs 2009; Pervan and Chan 2003). It has been proved that only
37 satellite position errors perpendicular to LOS contributes to the differential range error (Matsumoto
38 et al. 1999). The GBAS ephemeris threat is categorized as type A and type B threats, where the
39 type A threat involves a satellite maneuver and type B does not. Type A is further categorized as
40 type A1 and type A2, where the maneuver of type A1 is scheduled and A2 is not. For CAT I
41 approaches, a YE-TE (Yesterday-minus-Today Ephemeris) test is used to monitor the Type B
42 ephemeris threat where the ephemeris is compared with a previously validated ephemeris
43 (Matsumoto et al. 1999; Pullen et al. 2001; Gratton et al. 2004; Pervan and Gratton 2005). The
44 difference between the computed and predicted range and range rates with pseudorange corrections
45 is also used for this purpose (Tang et al. 2010). Due to the limited precision of the test statistics, it
46 can only be used for CAT I approaches.

47 For CAT II/III approaches with more stringent requirements, aviation users also need
48 protection against type A threat, for which the YE-TE approach is not applicable. The double
49 differenced (DD) phase observations are commonly used as the test statistics in the ephemeris
50 monitor for CAT II/III approaches (Pervan and Chan 2003; Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020),
51 which is also used for monitoring the ionosphere threat (Khanafseh et al. 2012). With dual-
52 frequency signals available for civil aviation, e.g., GPS L1 and L5, a second test statistics is
53 proposed using the Wide-Lane (WL) combination (Patel et al. 2020). The purpose is to enlarge the
54 wavelength, and the cost is the 4.9 times inflated standard deviation. With less noise in test statistics,
55 the monitor is able to detect smaller ephemeris faults. Therefore, the DD phase observation is a
56 preferred choice to achieve better performance.

57 The critical issue using the high precision phase observations for integrity monitoring is the
58 ambiguity resolution (AR). With the DD observation as the test statistics, the WL ambiguity is

59 estimated by the difference between WL phase and DD code combinations, and the single
60 frequency ambiguity is fixed afterward (Pervan and Chan 2003). More recently, the single
61 difference (SD) observation between two ground stations is used to estimate the unknown
62 ambiguity in carrier phase for a single satellite (Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020). Although
63 the SD code noise is smaller than the DD code noise, the remaining receiver clock error is not
64 separable with the ambiguity for single epoch solutions. With the WL phase combination as the
65 test statistics, the WL ambiguity is fixed by the ionospheric-free (IF) Hatch-Melbourne-Wübbena
66 (HMW) combination (Patel et al. 2020) as the difference between the WL phase and Narrow Lane
67 (NL) code observations. Generally, if the wavelength is larger compared with the total noise in
68 cycles, the ambiguity can be fixed more easily. In order to avoid possible ephemeris failure in AR,
69 the combination used to estimate the ambiguity should be geometry-free (GF).

70 Since ambiguity fixing and ephemeris failure are not distinguishable, the probability of
71 wrong ambiguity (PWA) fixing poses an extra risk to ephemeris monitoring. The ambiguity
72 resolution should be considered in overbounding both the continuity risk and the integrity risk. The
73 required number of epochs for averaging new, acquired, and re-acquired satellites, and the
74 minimum length of baselines on the ground are proposed to satisfy the allocated continuity risk and
75 integrity risk (Pervan and Chan 2003). The satellite availability risk for GBAS bounds the
76 continuity risk, and the probability of false alarm (PFA) with the wrong ambiguity fixed is
77 considered negligible. The more recent work analyzed the compliance of the probability of missed
78 detection (PMD) (Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020), where the test statistic is a mixed
79 distribution containing both the possibilities of correct and wrong ambiguities. However, the
80 process is over-complicated, considering the PMD with the wrong ambiguity. We proved that the
81 PMD under the wrong ambiguity does not need overbounding since the prior probability of PWA
82 is constrained by the continuity risk to a level much lower than the required PMD region.
83 Furthermore, the minimum ground baseline is also derived based on the PMD requirement. Current
84 methods are compared, considering both the required number of epochs and the minimum ground
85 baselines.

86 The ephemeris error in GBAS differential positioning is introduced first, followed by the
87 single-frequency and dual-frequency test statistics of the ephemeris monitor. Current AR
88 approaches are described next, including an alternative approach proposed. Then, the required
89 number of epochs is derived based on the allocated continuity risk, and the minimum length of

90 ground baselines is derived based on the allocated PMD. Finally, numerical results are shown to
 91 illustrate the difference of various AR methods.

92

93 **Ephemeris Fault in Differential Range**

94 The GBAS differential range error Er is the residual error in the airborne smoothed pseudorange
 95 after applying corrections from the ground receivers. With the common errors from satellite and
 96 ground receiver removed, one of the residual errors is the ephemeris error. If the ephemeris data
 97 contains erroneous information, the ephemeris error becomes large enough to be considered as the
 98 ephemeris fault. The ephemeris fault ΔE_p from satellite j is expressed as a projection of baseline
 99 vector \mathbf{b} between airborne antenna and geometric centroid of the ground antennas onto the vector
 100 $\Delta \mathbf{e}_j^T$, which is the error in the LOS unit vector from ground to satellite j caused by the erroneous
 101 ephemeris. Another way to interpret the ephemeris fault is by the satellite position error $\Delta \mathbf{r}_j^T$, with
 102 which the baseline vector becomes the scalar (Matsumoto et al. 1999),

$$103 \quad \Delta E_{Er} = \Delta \mathbf{e}_j^T \mathbf{b} = \frac{\Delta \mathbf{r}_j^T (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{e}_j \mathbf{e}_j^T) \mathbf{b}}{\rho_j} \quad (1)$$

104 where \mathbf{e}_j is the LOS unit vector from ground station to satellite j , \mathbf{I} is the identity matrix, and ρ_j is
 105 the range from ground station to satellite j . It can, therefore, be concluded that only the satellite
 106 position error orthogonal to the LOS, i.e. $\Delta \mathbf{r}_j^T (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{e}_j \mathbf{e}_j^T)$, contributes to the differential range error.

107

108 **Ephemeris Monitor**

109 To meet the stringent requirements of CAT II/III approaches and protect users against both types
 110 of ephemeris faults, the DD phase observation is used as the test statistic. With the coordinates of
 111 ground stations precisely surveyed and the satellite position computed by the broadcast ephemeris
 112 data, the geometric range is compensated beforehand. The first test statistics is the single-frequency
 113 DD phase observation (Pervan and Chan 2003; Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020),

$$114 \quad t_{S_1} = \phi_1^{ij} = \lambda_1 N_1^{ij} + I_1^{ij} + \Delta E_{ts} + Tr^{ij} + \varepsilon_{dd_p1} \quad (2)$$

115 where the satellite with the highest elevation angle is used as the reference satellite i . The subscripts
 116 1 and 5 are used for noting the frequency of L1 and L5, λ_1 is the L1 wavelength, and N_1^{ij} is the L1

117 DD ambiguity. $\Delta E_{ts} = -(\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i - \tilde{\mathbf{e}}_j)^T \mathbf{x}_{ab}$ is the residual ephemeris error, where $\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i$ is the difference
 118 between the true LOS and the one computed by the broadcast ephemeris data for satellite i and $\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_j$
 119 is for satellite j . \mathbf{x}_{ab} is the baseline vector between two antennas of the ground receivers. The
 120 residual atmospheric errors include the L1 ionospheric error I_1^{ij} and the tropospheric error Tr^{ij} ,
 121 which are influenced by the baseline length. Further, $\varepsilon_{dd,p1}$ is the residual DD phase error due to
 122 multipath and noise, whose standard deviation $\sigma_{dd,p}$ is assumed the same for L1 and L5. The
 123 second test statistics is the dual-frequency WL combination (Patel et al. 2020),

$$124 \quad ts_2 = \phi_w^{ij} = \frac{f_1 \phi_1^{ij} - f_5 \phi_5^{ij}}{f_1 - f_5} = \lambda_w N_w^{ij} + I_w^{ij} + \Delta E_{ts} + Tr^{ij} + \varepsilon_{w,p} \quad (3)$$

125 where $\lambda_w = \frac{c}{f_1 - f_5}$ is the WL wavelength with c as the speed of light, $N_w^{ij} = N_1^{ij} - N_5^{ij}$ is the WL
 126 ambiguity, $\varepsilon_{w,p}$ is the WL phase noise whose standard deviation $\sigma_{w,p}$ is $\frac{\sqrt{f_1^2 + f_5^2} \sigma_{dd,p}}{f_1 - f_5}$ assuming L1
 127 and L5 carrier observations are independent. The WL ionosphere is $I_w^{ij} = \frac{f_1 I_1^{ij} - f_5 I_5^{ij}}{f_1 - f_5}$. If there is an
 128 ephemeris failure in satellite j , then

$$129 \quad \Delta E_{ts} = \Delta \mathbf{e}_j^T \mathbf{x}_{ab} = \frac{\Delta r_j^T (I - \mathbf{e}_j \mathbf{e}_j^T) \mathbf{x}_{ab}}{\rho_j} \quad (4)$$

130 where the ephemeris failure in the test statistics is proportional to \mathbf{x}_{ab} . It is observed from (1) and
 131 (4) that the only difference between the ephemeris failure in the differential range and the DD phase
 132 observation is the baseline length, i.e. b vs. \mathbf{x}_{ab} . Therefore, ts_1 and ts_2 can be used for monitoring
 133 the ephemeris fault in the differential range. However, they can only be used when the ambiguity
 134 is correctly fixed with high success rate and in a timely manner, since the ambiguity is not separable
 135 with the ephemeris failure.

136 It was observed that the residual troposphere Tr^{ij} can become abnormal (Guilbert et al.
 137 2017), triggering false alarms with both ts_1 and ts_2 . Considering that the impact of the troposphere
 138 is a local error, two baselines \mathbf{x}_{ab} and \mathbf{x}_{cd} parallel to the runway are used whose distance is long
 139 enough to cancel this effect. Only when the test statistics of both baselines exceed the threshold T ,
 140 e.g. $|ts_1^{ab}| > T$ and $|ts_1^{cd}| > T$, the alarm is generated (Patel et al. 2020). Similarly, this approach
 141 can also reduce the false alarms caused by the residual ionosphere I^{ij}/I_w^{ij} .

142

143

144 **Ambiguity Resolution Methods**

145 Currently, there are two AR methods proposed for ts_1 . The first method used the SD between two
 146 ground stations to estimate the SD ambiguity \widehat{N}_1^i by rounding (5). The DD ambiguity is obtained
 147 by differencing two SD ambiguities $N_1^{ij} = N_1^i - N_1^j$, which is referred to as the KPSF method
 148 (Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020),

$$149 \quad \frac{\phi_1^i - R_1^i}{\lambda_1} = N_1^i + \frac{2I_1^i}{\lambda_1} + \frac{\varepsilon_{sd_p}}{\lambda_1} - \frac{\varepsilon_{sd_c}}{\lambda_1} \quad (5)$$

150 where ϕ_1^i is the SD phase observation between ground stations a and b for satellite i , R_1^i is the SD
 151 code observation, I_1^i is the residual SD phase ionospheric error, ε_{sd_p} is the SD phase noise, and
 152 ε_{sd_c} is the SD code noise whose standard deviation is σ_{sd_c} . The second method needs estimation
 153 of two ambiguities referred as the method by Pervan and Chan (2003), i.e. PC method. The WL
 154 ambiguity \widehat{N}_w^{ij} is estimated first by rounding the difference between the WL phase and DD code,

$$155 \quad \frac{\phi_w^{ij} - R_1^{ij}}{\lambda_w} = N_w^{ij} + \frac{I_w^{ij} + I_1^{ij}}{\lambda_w} + \frac{\varepsilon_{w_p}}{\lambda_w} - \frac{\varepsilon_{dd_c}}{\lambda_w} \quad (6)$$

156 where R_1^{ij} is the L1 DD code observation with the residual multipath and noise as ε_{dd_c} , whose
 157 standard deviation is σ_{dd_c} . The L1 DD ambiguity is then obtained by,

$$158 \quad \frac{\phi_1^{ij} - \phi_5^{ij} - \lambda_5 N_w^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} = N_1^{ij} + \frac{I_1^{ij} - I_5^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} + \frac{\varepsilon_{dd_p1}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} - \frac{\varepsilon_{dd_p5}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \quad (7)$$

159 where the standard deviation is $\sqrt{2}\sigma_{dd_c}$ and the residual ionosphere is the dominating error. The
 160 AR method for ts_2 uses the HMW combination referred as the KPDF method (Patel et al. 2020).
 161 The WL ambiguity is estimated by,

$$162 \quad \frac{\phi_w^{ij} - R_n^{ij}}{\lambda_w} = N_w^{ij} + \frac{\varepsilon_{w_p}}{\lambda_w} - \frac{\varepsilon_{n_c}}{\lambda_w} \quad (8)$$

163 where $R_n^{ij} = \frac{f_1 R_1 + f_5 R_5}{f_1 + f_5}$ is the NL code combination with residual multipath and noise as ε_{n_c} , whose

164 standard deviation σ_{n_c} is $\frac{\sqrt{f_1^2 + f_5^2} \sigma_{dd_c}}{f_1 + f_5}$, assuming the L1 and L5 code observations are independent.

165 An alternative AR method is proposed for ts_1 with the WL ambiguity estimated by (8) and the
 166 single-frequency ambiguity estimated by (7), which is referred as the PC_ALT method. It is
 167 compared with other methods in the following sections considering both the criteria of the required
 168 number of epochs n_t and the minimum baselines of GBAS ground stations x_{min} .

169

170 Required Number of Epochs

171 With the antennas phase variation calibrated, it was demonstrated that σ_{dd_p} is overbounded as 0.6
 172 cm (Khanafseh et al. 2012) and σ_{dd_c} is overbounded as 84 cm (Khanafseh et al. 2017). The PFA
 173 allocated for the ephemeris monitor is 10^{-8} for CAT II/III GBAS (Annex-10 2018), which is
 174 expressed as a combination of probabilities under correct ambiguity (CA) and wrong ambiguities
 175 (WA) with prior probabilities as P_{CA} and P_{WA} separately,

$$176 \quad P_{FA} = P(FA|CA)P_{CA} + P(FA|WA)P_{WA} \quad (9)$$

177 where P_{FA} is allocated to CA and WA equally. The PFA under correct ambiguity $P(FA|CA)$ is
 178 bounded as 0.5×10^{-8} with P_{CA} close to 1. $P(FA|CA)$ is defined with ts_1 as an example,

$$179 \quad P(FA|CA) = P(|ts_1^{ab}| > T \cap |ts_1^{cd}| > T | H_0) \quad (10)$$

180 where ts_1^{ab} is the test statistics ts_1 of baseline x_{ab} with ambiguity resolved, and ts_1^{cd} is similarly
 181 defined for baseline x_{cd} . To evaluate $P(FA|WA)$, the residual ambiguities in the test statistics with
 182 WA is analyzed first. Assuming the rounding of (5)-(8) generates maximum ± 1 wrong ambiguity,
 183 the residual ambiguity in the test statistic is derived in the Appendix, e.g. $5N_l$ with the PC_ALT
 184 method. Other methods are derived in similar ways, including $2N_l$ with the KPSF method, $5N_l$ with
 185 the PC method, and N_w with the KPDF method. Therefore, the thresholds are far larger than the
 186 bias in test statistics caused by the wrong ambiguities. It is thereby reasonable to assume that
 187 $P(FA|WA)$ is bounded by 1. Therefore, 0.5×10^{-8} is allocated to P_{WA} . For cascaded ambiguity
 188 resolution with PC and PC_ALT methods, half of the risk is allocated for P_{WA} of N_w and N_l each
 189 as 0.25×10^{-8} (Pervan and Chan 2003). The corresponding K-value K_{AR} is 5.85 for the KPDF and
 190 KPSF methods and 5.96 for PC and PC_ALT methods. The required standard deviation σ_t of the
 191 combinations in (5)-(6) is derived in Table 1 with the following inequation,

$$192 \quad K_{AR}\sigma_t \leq \frac{1}{2} \quad (11)$$

193 where σ_t is achieved by averaging within the required number of epochs n_t . The original standard
194 deviation σ_o can be expressed as $\sqrt{n_t}\sigma_t$ assuming each epoch is independent with each other,
195 which is used to derive n_t in Table 1. With the combinations in (5), (6) and (8) dominated by the
196 code noise, the standard deviations are derived in Table 1 together with n_t for each approach.
197 Considering the correlation between two SD phase observations, it is derived that $\sigma_{dd_c} \leq \sqrt{2}\sigma_{sd_c}$.
198 Therefore, $\sigma_{sd_c} \geq \frac{\sigma_{dd_c}}{\sqrt{2}}$ is used to derive the minimum n_t in Table 1. It should be noted that since
199 σ_{sd_c} is not bounded, the resulting n_t can only serve the purpose of comparison. As shown in Table
200 1, the required epochs for new rising, acquired, and re-acquired satellites with the PC, KPDF and
201 PC_ALT methods are 181, 87 and 94, respectively. The KPSF method requires more than 1322
202 epochs for a single satellite, and for two satellites, it can even be longer.

203
204 **Table 1** Required number of epochs n_t

Method	Ambiguity	λ (cm)	$\sigma_o \cdot \lambda$ (cm)	σ_o	σ_t	n_t
<i>KPDF</i>	<i>DD N_w</i>	75	60.0	0.80	0.086	87
<i>PC_ALT</i>	<i>DD N_w</i>	75	60.0	0.80	0.084	91
	<i>DD N_l</i>	6	0.85	0.14		3
<i>PC</i>	<i>DD N_w</i>	75	84	1.12	0.084	178
	<i>DD N_l</i>	6	0.85	0.14		3
<i>KPSF</i>	<i>SD N_l</i>	19	≥ 59.4	≥ 3.13	0.086	≥ 1322

205
206 n_t is derived in Table 1, assuming independence in time. However, there is a correlation in
207 time for both code and phase observations with residual multipath. The time constant is
208 characterized as 2 s for code observations (Patel et al. 2020). For the phase observations, it may be
209 slightly larger than 2 s. This implies more time required for (7) to estimate *DD N_l* in both PC and
210 PC_ALT methods. However, since their required number of independent epochs is only 3, the
211 slight inflation of time with 3 epochs does not change the comparison results, i.e., the required time
212 maintains the sequence of *KPDF* < *PC_ALT* < *PC* < *KPSF*.

213
214

215

216 **PMD Compliance**

217 Although the PWA is constrained as 0.5×10^{-8} , the ambiguity with ± 1 difference from the correct
218 ambiguity may still be rounded when $K_{AR}\sigma_t$ is close to 0.5. Therefore, the impact of the residual
219 ambiguities should be accounted for in integrity monitoring. The PMD under the faulty hypothesis
220 H_j is defined in a similar way (Patel et al. 2020),

$$221 \quad P_{MD} = P(MD|CA)P_{CA} + P(MD|WA)P_{WA} \quad (12)$$

222 where $P(MD|WA)$ is caused by the masking effect of the residual ambiguity on the ephemeris fault
223 is considered (Khanafseh et al. 2017; Patel et al. 2020). With P_{WA} bounded at 0.5×10^{-8} by averaging
224 within the required number of epochs, $P(MD|WA)P_{WA}$ is also guaranteed to be lower than 0.5×10^{-8} .
225 As shown in the PMD required region in Fig. 1, there is no requirement on PMD values below
226 0.5×10^{-8} . Therefore, $P(MD|WA)$ can be neglected in the PMD compliance analysis and only
227 $P(MD|CA)$ is considered, which is expressed as,

$$228 \quad P(MD|CA) = P(|ts_1^{ab}| \leq T \cup |ts_1^{cd}| \leq T | H_a) \quad (13)$$

229 where the correlation coefficient between ts_1^{ab} and ts_1^{cd} is ρ , which is caused by common satellites
230 with correlated ionospheric, tropospheric, and multipath errors. Since ρ varies as satellite moves,
231 the relevant risks are bounded for an arbitrary ρ ,

$$232 \quad P(FA|CA) \leq \alpha \quad (14)$$


$$233 \quad \beta \leq P(MD|CA) \leq 1 - (1 - \beta)^2 \quad (15)$$

234 where $\alpha = P(|ts_1^{ab}| > T | H_0)$, $\beta = P(|ts_1^{ab}| < T | H_a)$. The extreme values are obtained by $\rho=0$
235 and $\rho=1$. With $P(FA|CA)$ bounded by α , the threshold T is therefore obtained by α , which is 3.5
236 cm for ts_1 and 17.2 cm for ts_2 . Also, the PMD compliance is conducted with the bounded value
237 of $1 - (1 - \beta)^2$.

238 The PMD requirement for the integrity monitor is given as a function of ΔE_{er} (Brenner and
239 Liu 2010). Since ΔE_{ts} and ΔE_{er} is a ratio of x_{ab} and b , PMD versus ΔE_{ts} can be mapped to PMD
240 versus ΔE_{er} . x_{ab} is fixed at certain airport, and b varies when the aircraft is approaching the ground
241 station. The maximum distance between a landing aircraft and the ground station at the decision
242 height of CAT II/III approaches is 5 km as the Landing Threshold Point (LTP), and the PMD
243 required region applies within this distance. With a given ephemeris fault, Er is smaller with the
244 decrease of b , making it easier to satisfy the PMD requirement. Therefore, $b=5$ km is considered
245 as the driving value for PMD compliance analysis. If the ground baseline is too long, the residual

246 ionosphere and troposphere might decrease the sensitivity of the test statistics towards the
 247 ephemeris fault, and the residual ionosphere might increase the difficulty of estimating the correct
 248 ambiguity. However, when the ionospheric and tropospheric errors are not dominating factors, the
 249 ephemeris fault can be more easily detected with longer ground baseline x_{ab} , and larger x_{ab} is
 250 easier to satisfy the PMD requirement. By varying the value of x_{ab} , the minimum x_{ab} to satisfy
 251 the PMD required region is obtained as shown in Fig. 1, where the red curve is the PMD required
 252 region and the blue line is obtained when $b = 23x_{ab}$ for ts_1 with $b=5$ km.

253



254

255 **Fig. 1** PMD with ts_1 at LTP when $x_{ab} = 218$ m

256

257 It is observed from Fig. 1 that the monitor can satisfy the PMD requirement when x_{ab} is not
 258 less than 218 m at the LTP. A similar conclusion can be obtained with ts_2 with 1.1 km minimum
 259 baseline as listed in Table 2, where σ_{ts} is the standard deviation of the test statistics.

260

261

Table 2 x_{min} to satisfy the PMD requirements

Method	Test Statistics	σ_{ts} (cm)	$x_{min}(P_{MD})$ (m)
<i>PC</i>	ts_1	0.60	218
<i>KPSF</i>	ts_1	0.60	218
<i>KPDF</i>	ts_2	2.96	1111
<i>PC_ALT</i>	ts_1	0.60	218


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263

264 **Simulation Results**

265 The AR is further demonstrated by the 0.2 Hz SatRef data on Oct 10, 2019 in Hong Kong. Two
266 stations HKKT and HKLT, with a baseline of 7.8 km, are used to form the DD observations. Due
267 to the limitation of GPS L5 signals, L2 signals are used for the purpose of demonstration with
268 similar results. For ts_1 , three AR methods are compared with the real-time float ambiguity results.


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Fig 2 Float SD-L1 Ambiguity with KPSF method




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273

Fig 3 Float WL-Ambiguity with PC method

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275

276

Fig 4 Float WL-Ambiguity with PC_ALT method

277

278 As shown in above figures, the noise level is consistent with the standard deviations
279 assumed in Table 1. Comparing the results in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, the PC_ALT method contains less
280 noise than the PC method for estimation of the WL ambiguity. It should be noted that this numerical
281 result is only used for the purpose of comparison. The overbounding of test statistics requires data
282 from GBAS testbeds with the multipath limiting antennas.

283

284 **Conclusion**

285 The ephemeris monitors in GBAS for CAT II/III approaches are compared together with
286 procedures for ambiguity resolution. Both PFA and PMD are accommodated, considering the risks
287 introduced by the ambiguity resolution. The PWA is constrained by the required number of epochs
288 for averaging the new, acquired, and re-acquired satellites. With the ephemeris fault closely related
289 to the baseline length, the minimum ground baseline length is derived by the PMD requirement,
290 which is obtained by fixing airborne to ground baseline length and varying the ground baseline
291 length. It has been demonstrated that the best performance is achieved by the PC_ALT method
292 considering both the requirement of the 94 averaging epochs for new satellites and the 218 m
293 minimum baseline for GBAS ground stations.

294

295

296 **Acknowledgment**

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298 generation GNSS integrity monitoring for civil aviation.

299

300 **Data Availability**

301 The data supporting this research is from the Hong Kong Geodetic Survey Services (SatRef) and
302 can be obtained from <https://www.geodetic.gov.hk/en/index.htm>.

303

304 **Appendix: Residual Ambiguities**

305 For the PC_ALT method under WA,

$$306 \quad \left| \widehat{N}_w^{ij} - N_w^{ij} = \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\phi_w^{ij} - R_n^{ij}}{\lambda_w} \right]_{round} - N_w^{ij} \right\rfloor \leq 1 \right. \quad (a1)$$

307 the maximum residual N_w bounded by (9) is assumed to be 1. Similarly,

$$308 \quad \left| \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\phi_1^{ij} - \phi_5^{ij} - \lambda_5 N_w^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} - N_1^{ij} \right\rfloor \leq 1 \right. \quad (a2)$$

309 where the maximum residual N_l is also 1 assuming the correct N_w^{ij} input. Therefore, the residual
310 ambiguities in the test statistics is $5N_l$ with the PC_ALT method,

$$311 \quad \left| \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\phi_1^{ij} - \phi_5^{ij} - \lambda_5 \widehat{N}_w^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} - N_1^{ij} \right\rfloor \leq \left| \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\phi_1^{ij} - \phi_5^{ij} - \lambda_5 N_w^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} \pm \left[\frac{\lambda_5}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} - N_1^{ij} \right\rfloor \right|$$
$$312 \quad \leq \left| \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\phi_1^{ij} - \phi_5^{ij} - \lambda_5 N_w^{ij}}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} - N_1^{ij} \right\rfloor \pm \left\lfloor \left[\frac{\lambda_5}{\lambda_1 - \lambda_5} \right]_{round} \right\rfloor \right| \leq 5 \quad (a3)$$

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